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Abstract
This paper studies investment incentives in the steady state of a dynamic bi-
lateral matching market. Because of search frictions, both parties in a match are
partially locked–in when they bargain over the joint surplus from their sunk invest-
ments. The associated holdup problem depends on market conditions and is more
important for the long side of the market. In the case of investments in homoge-
nous capital only the agents on the short side acquire ownership of capital. There
is always underinvestment on both sides of the market. But when market frictions
become negligible, the equilibrium investment levels tend towards the first–best.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies investment incentives in a bilateral matching market with search fric-
tions. The agents on both sides of the market make their investment decisions before
entering the matching process. In a match they negotiate about sharing the joint sur-
plus from their sunk investments. Since switching to an alternative bargaining partner
involves search costs, both parties in a match are partially locked–in. This generates a
holdup problem for the agents’ investment decisions at the market entry stage. We inves-
tigate how the resulting underinvestment effect depends on market conditions. It turns
out that the holdup problem is more important for the long side of the matching mar-
ket. Therefore, these agents invest less than the agents on the short side of the market,
even when the investments of all agents are equally productive. Indeed, in the case of
investments in homogenous capital only the agents on the short side of the market acquire
ownership of capital.
In our setting, the productivity of investments is independent of the trading partners’
identity. Nonetheless, in a match the traders are partially locked–in because they face
search frictions. The level these frictions determines the degree to which investments
effectively become relation-specific in a particular match. The agents discount future
utilities and so their outside options decrease with the expected length of time to achieve
a transaction with an alternative bargaining partner. Thus the agents’ discount rate
reflects the degree of asset specificity in a match. Following Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1984), we can study a ‘frictionless market’ by considering the equilibrium outcome when
the time cost associated with the matching process becomes negligible. In this limit, the
parties in a match are no longer locked-in and the holdup problem disappears, because
switching to another trading partner is costless. We show that in such a ‘frictionless
market’ the agents’ investments at the market entry stage are indeed efficient in the sense
that they maximize the joint surplus from a match.
The holdup problem in its classical formulation refers to relationship–specific invest-
ments in environments with incomplete contracts.1 The trading partners make invest-
ments that have little value outside the relationship. These investments are observed by
the partners but are not verifiable in court. Therefore contracts are incomplete, and the
partners negotiate the division of the surplus ex post at a stage where the investments are
1See e.g. Grout (1984), Williamson (1985), Hart and Moore (1988). Schmitz (2001) provides a survey
on the holdup problem and incomplete contracts.
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sunk. Accordingly, they will not be able to appropriate the full marginal benefit of their
investment, which typically leads to underinvestment in specific assets.2 In this paper,
the agents cannot contract over the levels of investments because investments are made
before entering the matching process and meeting a trading partner. As emphasized by
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), this seems relevant in many situations. For instance, in a
labor market firms invest before hiring workers and workers acquire human capital before
finding a job.
The holdup problem in our context may provide an explanation of asset ownership
that differs from the theory of property rights as developed by Grossman and Hart (1986)
and Hart and Moore (1990).3 In their theory, the residual control right associated with the
ownership of physical assets determines the parties’ outside options in ex post bargaining
and, therefore, affects their ex ante incentives for human capital investments. Before mak-
ing these investments, agents can contractually reallocate property rights. The resulting
cooperative allocation of asset ownership then minimizes the inefficiencies generated by
the holdup problem.4 In our model the agents acquire physical assets through their ex ante
investments. Since investment incentives depend on the nature of the matching process,
the non–cooperative allocation of asset ownership is determined by market conditions.
Consider for example a labor market where unemployed workers are randomly matched
with entrepreneurs, who seek to fill vacancies. As Samuelson (1957) notes, in a compet-
itive Walrasian market it remains unclear whether workers or entrepreneurs become the
owners of capital. But we show that only the entrepreneurs will invest in homogenous
capital inputs whenever there are more unemployed workers than vacancies. In this sit-
uation the holdup problem is more serious for the workers than for the entrepreneurs.
Therefore the entrepreneurs can realize a higher marginal return on their investment and
only they become capitalists.
Our analysis relies on the steady state equilibrium of a dynamic matching market,
similar to the one used by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1984) and Gale (1987). On each
2While some authors argue that ex post negotiations necessarily lead to inefficient investments (Hart
and Moore (1988), Che and Hausch (1999)), others have identified contractual devices and environments
that induce first–best investments even with incomplete contracts (Chung (1991), Aghion, Dewatripont
and Rey (1994), No¨ldeke and Schmidt (1995), Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), Rogerson (1992), Che and
Sakovics (2004), and Evans (2008)).
3Hart (2009) presents a different explanation of asset ownership in which the driving force is payoff
uncertainty, rather than the non–contractibility of investments.
4Gans (2005) modifies this approach by studying a non–cooperative market for asset ownership.
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side of the market there is a constant number of active agents who remain in the market
until they have traded. Their matching probabilities reflect the relative number of active
agents. At each point in time, there is a constant flow of potential market entrants. In
the steady state, the number of agents who enter is identical to the number of agents
who exit after trade. We combine the market entry stage with the agents’ investment
decisions. Each agent who enters the market selects his investment as a best response
against the equilibrium choices of the other agents. Our assumptions on the productivity
of investments include the different categories that have been considered in the literature
on the holdup problem. The model applies for instance to a buyer–seller market in
which the sellers make ‘cooperative investments’ in product quality to increase the buyers’
valuation of the good. We also allow for ‘selfish investments’ as for example the acquisition
of human capital by workers in a labor market. Further, our analysis applies not only
to ‘one–sided investments’ but also to ‘two–sided investments’. In the latter case, the
investments on both sides of the markets may be substitutes as well as complements.
This paper relates to a few articles that study investment incentives in matching
environments. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) consider a labor market in which firms make
one–sided investments before matching workers. They show that ex post bargaining
over wages will always induce inefficiencies: As long as workers have some bargaining
power, firms underinvest because more capital–intensive production leads to higher wages.
If, however, workers have no bargaining power, then there is excessive entry of firms.
These inefficiencies can be prevented when the firms can commit to posting wages ex
ante. Similarly, Felli and Roberts (2001) show that Bertrand competition may resolve the
holdup problem of match specific investments.
Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (2001) present a two-sided matching model in which
buyers and sellers make complementary investments prior to matching. As in our model,
the agents’ outside options in a match are determined endogenously by their investments.
But there are no search frictions in their model. Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite consider
stable matchings and show that efficient investment decisions can always be sustained in
equilibrium. Inefficient equilibria typically also exist, but they are ‘constrained’ efficient.
In Ramey and Watson (2001) non–contractible investment decisions are made after
two agents are matched and start a relationship. At the beginning of their relation the
agents non–cooperatively choose long–term investments. In each period they simultane-
ously select ongoing efforts that determine whether their cooperation remains productive.
Since market frictions shape effort incentives, a frictionless market can actually minimize
3
welfare. In certain cases there exists an optimal positive level of frictions that leads to
first–best investments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model.
Section 3 derives the steady–state equilibrium. In Section 4 we analyze how market
conditions affect investment incentives in the presence of the holdup problem. Section 5
concludes.
2 The Model
Our model considers the steady state of a random matching market with two types of
agents. In each period, new agents of both types arrive and decide about entering the
market. When entering the market, an agent also decides about his investment. This
investment increases the surplus available from a match with an agent of the other type.
After an agent enters the market, he is matched with an agent of the other type by a
stochastic process. In such a match, the two agents bargain about sharing their joint
surplus. If they reach an agreement, they leave the market. Otherwise, both enter the
matching process again.
More specifically, we consider the following environment. Time is discrete and is
indexed by the integers. Since we consider a steady state, all variables remain constant
over time. There are two types of agents, indexed i = A,B, who are risk–neutral and
discount future payoffs by the common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). All agents of a particular
type are identical. In each period t, there is a mass of M¯i > 0 of agents of type i considering
entering the market. If an agent does not enter, he disappears and obtains utility zero.
We denote by hi ∈ [0, 1] the fraction of i–type agents that enter the market. This means
that in each period hiM¯i agents of type i join those who are already active in the matching
market.
An agent of type i who decides to enter the market chooses his investment Ii ≥ 0.
As we explain below, the investments (IA, IB) determine the surplus that can be realized
when two agents meet in the market. In addition, each agent who enters the market has
to pay a (small) fixed cost f > 0. After spending Ii+ f in period t, the agent participates
in the matching process in period t+ 1.
The steady state mass of traders of type i who are actively searching for a match in
the market is denoted as Mi. The number Mi is endogenously determined by the flows
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of agents who enter and exit the matching process. In each period, each agent of type
i is matched with at most one agent of type j 6= i. The probability of an A–type agent
to meet a B–type agent is denoted as α ∈ [0, 1]. Analogously, a B–type is matched
with an A–type with probability β ∈ [0, 1]. The probabilities α and β depend on the
matching technology and the numbers of searching agents. The total number of matches
in each period is assumed to be a strictly increasing and linearly homogenous function of
(MA,MB).
5 Therefore, the individual matching probability for type i depends only on the
ratio mi ≡Mi/(MA +MB). In what follows, we assume that α = α(mA) and β = β(mB)
satisfy the following conditions:
Assumption 1 (i) The matching probabilities α(mA) and β(mB) are continuous and
non–increasing for all mi ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, they satisfy α(mA) > 0 for all mA ∈ [0, 1),
β(mB) > 0 for all mB ∈ [0, 1), and α(1) = β(1) = 0. (ii) For all (MA,MB) ∈ IR
2
++,
α(mA)MA = β(mB)MB. (1)
By part (i) of this assumption, for a given numberMi type i is less likely to be matched
with a type j if the numberMj of agents on the other side of the market decreases. Indeed,
in the limit Mj → 0 the probability to meet type j approaches zero. Part (ii) is a simple
consistency condition for bilateral matchings. Since each agent is matched with at most
one agent of the other type, the total number of matches must be identical for both
types of agents. A simple example for such a matching process is the efficient matching
technology. With this technology, Mi ≤Mj implies that all agents of type i are matched
so that Mj −Mi agents of type j 6= i remain unmatched. Accordingly,
α = min
[
MB
MA
, 1
]
= min
[
1−mA
mA
, 1
]
, β = min
[
MA
MB
, 1
]
= min
[
1−mB
mB
, 1
]
. (2)
When matched in period t, agent A and B negotiate about sharing the surplus from
their investments. If they disagree, both enter the matching process again in period t+1.
We denote by Vi type i’s expected payoff from searching for a partner. This means that,
when bargaining in period t, the agents’ outside options are δVA and δVB, respectively.
Of course, VA and VB are endogenously determined in equilibrium. As will become clear
in the next section, in particular an agent’s expected payoff from entering the matching
5These properties of the matching function are usually assumed in the theoretical and empirical
literature on search markets, see e.g. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
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market depends on his own investment and the investments of the other agents in the
market.
If two matched agents agree to cooperate, their (gross) payoffs depend on their invest-
ments and are given by UA(IA, IB) and UB(IA, IB), respectively. We denote by
S(IA, IB) ≡ UA(IA, IB) + UB(IA, IB) (3)
the available joint (gross) surplus in a match. As long as S(IA, IB) > δ(VA + VB), both
agents can gain by splitting the surplus. We describe a partition of the surplus by a
transfer τ from agent A to agent B. If τ < 0, this indicates a payment from agent B to
agent A. For simplicity, we use the Nash bargaining solution do describe the outcome of
bargaining over τ.6 Since the agents’ outside options are δVA and δVB, this means that
they agree on the transfer
τ ∗ = argmaxτ [UA(IA, IB)− τ − δVA] [UB(IA, IB) + τ − δVB] (4)
Thus τ ∗ = [UA(IA, IB)− δVA − UB(IA, IB) + δVB]/2 and the bargaining payoffs are
UA(IA, IB)− τ
∗ = [S(IA, IB) + δVA − δVB] /2, (5)
UB(IA, IB) + τ
∗ = [S(IA, IB)− δVA + δVB] /2.
After agreeing upon τ ∗ the agents in a match realize the payoffs in (5) and then leave the
market.
The literature on the holdup problem distinguishes between selfish and cooperative in-
vestments. Purely selfish investments directly benefit only the investor so that ∂Ui/∂Ii > 0
and ∂Uj/∂Ii = 0. For instance, if the A–type agents are sellers and the B–type agents
are buyers, a selfish investment by the seller reduces his production costs. In contrast,
purely cooperative investments directly benefit only the other party so that ∂Ui/∂Ii = 0
and ∂Uj/∂Ii > 0. An example is the seller’s investment in quality, which increases the
buyer’s value of the good.
A large part of the literature further focuses on one–sided investments. In this case only
one side of the market is able to increase the surplus S by its investment so that ∂S/∂Ii = 0
for some i ∈ {A,B}. In contrast, with two–sided investments both types of agents can
make productive investments. An example is a labor market where entrepreneurs invest
in factory equipment and workers invest in human capital before searching for a match.
6Our results do not rely on the specific properties of the Nash bargaining solution. The same results
could be obtained with other cooperative or non–cooperative bargaining rules.
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The following assumptions on S(·, ·) cover the above categories of investments as spe-
cial cases.
Assumption 2 (i) S(0, 0) > 2 f. (ii) S(·, ·) is strictly concave and continuously differ-
entiable on IR2+. (iii) S(·, ·) satisfies
∂S(IA, IB)
∂Ii
≥ 0, max
i
∂S(0, 0)
∂Ii
> 1, lim
Ii→∞
∂S(IA, IB)
∂Ii
< 1, (6)
for i = 1, 2.
Part (i) of this assumption ensures that, for δ sufficiently large, the gains from trade
exceed the market entry costs. By parts (ii) and (iii),
(IˆA, IˆB) ≡ argmax(IA,IB) S(IA, IB)− IA − IB (7)
is uniquely defined and satisfies IˆA + IˆB > 0. Equation (7) describes the efficient invest-
ments in the limit δ → 1, where the time interval between investing (IA, IB) and realizing
the surplus S(IA, IB) plays no role.
3 Steady State Equilibrium
In equilibrium, new agents enter the market if this yields non–negative expected payoffs.
We consider a symmetric equilibrium in which all agents of type i chose the same level of
investment Ii at the entry stage. In a steady state, the number of new entrants is equal
to the number of agents who exit after successful match.
We first derive the expected payoffs from being active in the market. Let (I∗A, I
∗
B)
denote the agents’ equilibrium investments. Thus, when a pair of agents is matched in
the market, they bargain about a division of the joint surplus S(I∗A, I
∗
B). At the beginning
of period t, an agent of type A expects to be matched with probability α. In a steady state
equilibrium, all matches induce an agreement on the transfer τ ∗, which by (4) divides the
joint surplus according to the Nash bargaining solution.7 Thus, agent A’s payoff from
bargaining in a match is given by UA(I
∗
A, I
∗
B) − τ
∗ in (5). With probability 1 − α he
7We show that the condition S > δ(VA+VB) for an agreement is automatically satisfied in equilibrium
at the end of this paragraph.
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remains unmatched and continues searching for a match in t+1. Therefore, his expected
payoff from participating in the matching process is
V ∗A = α [S(I
∗
A, I
∗
B) + δV
∗
A − δV
∗
B] /2 + (1− α)δV
∗
A . (8)
Analogously, we obtain for an agent of type B
V ∗B = β [S(I
∗
A, I
∗
B)− δV
∗
A + δV
∗
B] /2 + (1− β)δV
∗
B. (9)
Solving equations (8) and (9) yields
V ∗A =
αS(I∗A, I
∗
B)
2(1− δ) + δ(α+ β)
, V ∗B =
βS(I∗A, I
∗
B)
2(1− δ) + δ(α+ β)
(10)
Note that (10) implies S(I∗A, I
∗
B) > δ(V
∗
A + V
∗
B). Since in a steady state equilibrium
the available net surplus is positive in a match, efficient bargaining always induces an
agreement according to the Nash bargaining solution described by (4).
Using (10) we can now describe the agents’ market entry decisions. To ensure that
the market operates and entry takes place, it is required that investing I∗i and paying the
entry cost f does not generate a negative payoff for either type i. Therefore, it must be
the case that
δV ∗A ≥ I
∗
A + f, δV
∗
B ≥ I
∗
B + f. (11)
If the inequality in (11) is strict for some type i, then entry actually generates a positive
profit. In this case, all M¯i agents will enter the market so that hi = 1. This is reflected
by the following equilibrium condition:
(1− h∗A)(δV
∗
A − I
∗
A − f) = 0, (1− h
∗
B)(δV
∗
B − I
∗
B − f) = 0. (12)
Note that, by (11) and (12), h∗i ∈ (0, 1) implies δV
∗
i = I
∗
i + f. Thus, if not all agents
of type i enter the market, this type must be indifferent between entering and obtaining
zero utility from disappearing.
The entry conditions and the matching technology determine the steady state numbers
(MA,MB) of agents who are searching for a partner. In each period, αMA agents of type
A and βMB agents of type B are matched and leave the market. In the steady state,
the number of agents who leave and exit the market must be identical so that (MA,MB)
remains constant. This is ensured by the following condition:
α
(
M∗A
M∗A +M
∗
B
)
M∗A = h
∗
AM¯A, β
(
M∗B
M∗A +M
∗
B
)
M∗B = h
∗
BM¯B. (13)
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Finally, the agents’ equilibrium investments (I∗A, I
∗
B) have to be consistent with max-
imization of expected payoffs at the entry stage. If the investments of all agents in the
market are given by (I∗A, I
∗
B), no single agent of type i should gain from deviating to
Ii 6= I
∗
i . Consider a single agent of type A who invests IA in a situation where the in-
vestments of all other agents in the market are given by (I∗A, I
∗
B). We denote this agent’s
expected payoff from participating in the matching process by V˜A. In a match with an
agent of type B, the available gross surplus is S(IA, I
∗
B), and the two parties’ payoffs
from disagreement are (δV˜A, δV
∗
B). Note that type B’s disagreement payoff is δV
∗
B, as de-
fined in (10), because he expects the other side in all future matches to have chosen the
equilibrium investment I∗A.
With probability α the A–type agent is matched and, as long as S(IA, I
∗
B) + δV˜A −
δV ∗B ≥ 0, an agreement is reached according to the Nash bargaining solution in (5). With
probability 1 − α he remains unmatched and continues searching in the next period.
Therefore, V˜A is determined as
V˜A = αmax
[
0, S(IA, I
∗
B) + δV˜A − δV
∗
B
]
/2 + (1− α)δV˜A. (14)
Thus V˜A depends on IA and (I
∗
A, I
∗
B) according to
V˜A(IA|I
∗
A, I
∗
B) ≡ max
[
0,
α[S(IA, I
∗
B)− δV
∗
B]
2(1− δ) + δα
]
. (15)
Analogously, we obtain for a single agent of type B who enters the market with the
investment IB that
V˜B(IB|I
∗
A, I
∗
B) ≡ max
[
0,
β[S(I∗A, IB)− δV
∗
A ]
2(1− δ) + δβ
]
. (16)
The following equilibrium conditions ensure that investing I∗i is a best response for each
single agent of type i to the investments (I∗A, I
∗
B) of all other agents in the market:
I∗A = argmaxIA δV˜A(IA|I
∗
A, I
∗
B)− IA, (17)
I∗B = argmaxIB δV˜B(IB|I
∗
A, I
∗
B)− IB.
Note that (15) and (16) are consistent with (10) as V˜i(I
∗
i |I
∗
A, I
∗
B) = V
∗
i .
In a steady state equilibrium, the variables
E∗ = {h∗i ,M
∗
i , V
∗
i , I
∗
i }i=A,B (18)
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satisfy conditions (10) – (13) and (17). To focus on outcomes where the matching market
actually operates, we require in addition that h∗A > 0 and h
∗
B > 0. This eliminates
equilibria with coordination failure, in which agents of type i do not enter because no
agent of type j 6= i is active in the market.
We first show that our assumptions on the matching probabilities, α(·) and β(·), and
the surplus function S(·, ·) guarantee the existence of an equilibrium:
Proposition 1 Let δ be sufficiently large. Then there exists an equilibrium E∗, and
I∗A + I
∗
B > 0 in any equilibrium E
∗.
Existence of an equilibrium requires the discount factor δ to be sufficiently large be-
cause otherwise the expected present value from a match would not cover the market
entry cost f. Indeed, the number of agents who enter the search market must be identical
for both types. This is so because after a bilateral match both parties leave the market
and are replaced by new entrants so that M∗A and M
∗
B remain constant. If there are more
agents of type i than of type j considering entering the market, this implies that some of
the M¯i agents must refrain from entering. Of course, this will be optimal for type i only
if the profit from entering is zero. Therefore, competition at the market entry stage leads
to the following observation:
Proposition 2 Let M¯i > M¯j. Then δV
∗
i = I
∗
i + f and h
∗
i < h
∗
j in any equilibrium E
∗.
In a centralized Walrasian market, a zero profit condition is ensured by the adjustment
of prices. In contrast, the zero profit condition in Proposition 2 relies on the adjustment
of the matching probabilities α and β. When outside the steady state more agents of type
i than of type j enter the market, then the ratio Mi/Mj of agent types in the matching
process increases over time. By Assumption 1 this lowers the matching probability of
type i and raises the matching probability of type j. Thereby, type i’s expected payoff Vi
from searching and his profit from entering the market are reduced.
Of course, the zero profit condition in Proposition 2 depends not only on the matching
probabilities but also on the equilibrium investments. Therefore, one cannot conclude that
M¯i > M¯j at the entry stage implies that also M
∗
i > M
∗
j for the numbers of active agents
in the market. As the following Proposition shows this is the case only if the surplus from
the efficient investments in (7) is large enough in relation to type i’s investment.
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Proposition 3 Let M¯i > M¯j and let (IˆA, IˆB) denote the investments defined in (7). Then
S(IˆA, IˆB) > 2 Iˆi + 2 f, (19)
implies that, for δ sufficiently large, M∗i > M
∗
j and V
∗
i < V
∗
j in any equilibrium E
∗. If
the inequality in (19) is reversed, then M∗i < M
∗
j and V
∗
i > V
∗
j for δ sufficiently large.
Notice that by Assumption 2 and (7), (19) is necessarily satisfied at least for one
type i ∈ {A,B}. As the proof of Proposition 3 shows, condition (19) implies that, for δ
sufficiently large, the equilibrium investment I∗i of the i–type agents is relatively small.
These agents, therefore, break–even at the market entry stage when they get less than half
of the available surplus in a match. As the division of the surplus is determined by the
matching probabilities, the zero profit condition in Proposition 2 thus implies M∗i > M
∗
j
so that type i is less likely to be matched than type j.
As a special case, condition (19) applies in markets with one–sided investments where
one type i does not invest so that Iˆi = 0. Consider, for example, a labor market where
each entrepreneur can employ one worker. Only the entrepreneurs invest in capital and
workers have no investment opportunities. If workers outnumber entrepreneurs at the
market entry stage, then by Proposition 3 also in the matching market the number of
workers exceeds the number of available jobs. Therefore, even with efficient matching
as in (2), some workers remain unemployed in each period. Moreover, as in Shaked and
Sutton (1984), unemployment is involuntary because the workers who are selected for a
job are better off than those who have to continue looking for employment.
4 Investments and the Holdup Problem
The agents’ investment incentives depend on the expected bargaining outcome, because
investments take place before the division of the surplus is determined. This creates a
holdup problem and so the equilibrium will be inefficient. The extent of this inefficiency
is related to the agents’ matching probabilities, which affect their outside options in a
match. As the matching probabilities reflect the numbers of active agents in the market,
these numbers are important for the equilibrium level of investments.
We first look at the case where the investments of type A and B are equally productive
because that they are perfect substitutes. The investments (IA, IB) are perfect substitutes
if the joint surplus in a match depends only on the sum IA + IB of the investments so
11
that S can be written as S(IA + IB). Any difference in the equilibrium investments I
∗
A
and I∗B is then related to the frictions of the matching process and does not depend on
asymmetries in productivity.8
Proposition 4 Let the agents’ investments be perfect substitutes. ThenM∗i > M
∗
j implies
I∗i = 0 in any equilibrium E
∗.
In the case of perfectly substitutable investments only the short side of the matching
market makes an investment and the other side does not invest at all. This happens
because the agents on the short side of the market have a higher matching probability.
Therefore, they can expect to realize the returns from their investment earlier than the
agents on the long side. This also increases the value of their outside options in a match
and so they can appropriate a larger share of the marginal surplus from their investment.
Consequently, investments are zero on the long side of the market, because with perfect
substitutes only the agent–type with the largest marginal private benefit will invest.
Proposition 4 may resolve Samuelson’s (1957) puzzle of why in a capitalist economy
workers do not invest in capital. Indeed, in a competitive economy it does not matter
whether capital hires labor or labor hires capital. Capital ownership is indeterminate
because firm revenues are distributed according to marginal productivity independently of
the investor’s identity. Therefore, both sides of the labor market have the same investment
incentives. This is not true, however, in our framework where market frictions affect
private returns from investments. Applied to a labor market with workers seeking for
vacancies offered by entrepreneurs, Proposition 4 implies that only the entrepreneurs
invest in homogenous capital inputs when there are fewer vacancies than workers.
The insight that the short side of the market invests more than the long side can be
generalized to situations in which the investments (IA, IB) are symmetric in the sense
that S(I ′, I ′′) = S(I ′′, I ′) for all (I ′, I ′′) ∈ IR2+. This means that the available surplus does
not depend on the investor’s type: The investments (IA, IB) generate the same surplus
as if type A would invest the amount IB and type B the amount IA. This property of
the surplus function includes perfectly substitutable investments as a special case; but
it allows also for imperfectly substitutable or complementary investments. The same
intuition as for Proposition 4 explains the following result:
8Notice that the following result remains valid if the investments are not perfect but sufficiently close
substitutes.
Proposition 5 Let the agents’ investments be symmetric. Then in any equilibrium E∗,
M∗i > M
∗
j implies I
∗
i < I
∗
j whenever I
∗
A + I
∗
B > 0.
Suppose for instance that each agent can raise his productivity in a match by investing
in human capital. If these investments are equally efficient for both types, then in a
perfectly competitive market all agents would acquire the same level of skills. Proposition
5 shows that our model does not have this efficiency property. Matching frictions and ex
post bargaining induce differential rates of skill acquisition as the long side of the market
invests less in human capital than the short side.
The inefficiency of the equilibrium investments arises because search frictions generate
a holdup problem. Both parties in a match are partially locked–in as searching for another
partner would delay an agreement. Therefore, the sunk investments are to some extent
match–specific. As the bargaining outcome divides the available surplus, each party
can only appropriate a share of the marginal return from its investment. This creates
insufficient investment incentives at the market entry stage. Indeed, by (17) each agent
i selects his investment Ii to maximize his net benefit δV˜i − Ii from entering the market.
He fails to take into account that his investment also increases the other market side’s
benefit from searching for a match.
The socially efficient investments would internalize this externality by maximizing the
joint payoff δ(V ∗A + V
∗
B) − IA − IB from entering the market. By (10) this joint payoff
depends on the investments (IA, IB) according to
W (IA, IB) ≡
δ(α+ β)
2(1− δ) + δ(α+ β)
S(IA, IB)− IA − IB. (20)
In the limit δ → 1, the joint payoff W is maximized by the investments (IˆA, IˆB) in (7).
Proposition 6 In any equilibrium E∗, underinvestment occurs because there exists an
(ǫA, ǫB) ∈ IR
2
+ such that
W (I∗A + ǫA, I
∗
B + ǫB) > W (I
∗
A, I
∗
B) (21)
whenever I∗A + I
∗
B > 0. Moreover, (21) holds for some (ǫA, ǫB) ∈ IR
2
++ if (I
∗
A, I
∗
B) ∈ IR
2
++.
Because the agents share the surplus but not the cost of their ex ante investments,
this leads to underinvestment. Indeed, in a market with two–sided investments both sides
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of the markets underinvest independently of whether the investments are substitutes or
complements. But, as Proposition 5 indicates, the holdup problem is more severe on the
long side of the market.
Search frictions arise in our model because the matching process consumes time and
the agents discount future utilities. Following Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1984), we can
remove these frictions and approximate a ‘frictionless market’ by considering the limiting
equilibrium as the discount factor δ approaches one. The following result shows that
the holdup problem and the underinvestment effect disappear when the market becomes
frictionless.
Proposition 7 For a given discount factor δ, let E∗(δ) denote an equilibrium. Then in
the limit δ → 1 the equilibrium investments become efficient, because
lim
δ→1
(I∗A(δ), I
∗
B(δ)) = (IˆA, IˆB), (22)
where (IˆA, IˆB) is defined in (7).
The inefficiency of the equilibrium investments becomes negligible as δ → 1. In this
limit, it follows from (10) that type A receives a share α/(α + β) and type B a share
β/(α + β) of the surplus S(I∗A, I
∗
B). But surplus sharing does not prevent agent i from
appropriating the full marginal return from his investment. Indeed, if he invests the
amount Ii, then by (15) and (16) his share of the surplus is equal to S(Ii, I
∗
j ) − V
∗
j in
the limit δ → 1. This means that in a match with an agent of type j 6= i, agent i has
to concede the fixed amount V ∗j to type j and he himself receives the entire surplus in
excess of V ∗j . Therefore, ex post bargaining does not distort investment decisions in a
frictionless market. Effectively, in such a market there is no longer a lock–in effect in a
match because searching for a new partner is costless.
For the case of two–sided investments, Proposition 7 also shows that there is no coor-
dination failure in the frictionless market, even when the agents’ investments are comple-
ments. In the limit δ → 1, (15) – (17) imply that the investments (I∗A, I
∗
B) are determined
by
S(I∗A, I
∗
B)− I
∗
A ≥ S(IA, I
∗
B)− IA for all IA ≥ 0, (23)
S(I∗A, I
∗
B)− I
∗
B ≥ S(I
∗
A, IB)− IB for all IB ≥ 0.
Thus (I∗A, I
∗
B) may be viewed as the Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous game between type
A and B. Perhaps surprisingly, this equilibrium coincides with the efficient investments
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(IˆA, IˆB) in (7). Important for this observation are the concavity and differentiability
properties of the function S(·, ·) under Assumption 2. These properties ensure that the
first–order conditions implied by (23) are identical to the necessary and sufficient first–
order conditions for the optimization problem in (7). Without concavity of S(·, ·) it
may happen that the investments (I∗A, I
∗
B) defined by (23) are merely locally rather than
globally efficient.
A major question in the literature on decentralized trading in matching markets con-
cerns the relation to the competitive Walrasian equilibrium when search frictions become
negligible.9 In our model, the steady state equilibrium approaches the perfectly compet-
itive outcome in the frictionless limit δ → 1. Indeed, by Proposition 2 all surplus at the
market entry stage goes to the type of agent that is present in smaller numbers, and the
other type earns zero profit. This is the Walrasian outcome of a market where the agents
on each side of the market are homogenous. Moreover, Proposition 7 shows that for δ → 1
the agents’ investments maximize the available surplus. This is the well–known efficiency
property of perfect competition.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed how search frictions affect investment incentives in a decentralized
matching market. These frictions generate a holdup problem and lead to underinvestment.
The importance of this problem depends on the matching process and differs for both
sides of the market. This can explain why investments and the ownership of assets are
concentrated on one side of the market. We have also shown that the holdup problem
disappears when search frictions tend to zero. The outcome of a frictionless decentralized
market has the same properties as the Walrasian equilibrium of a centralized market.
These results have been derived under standard neoclassical assumptions. The match-
ing technology of our model is homogenous of degree one so that the number of matches
is proportional to the number of agents active in the market. Further, the surplus in a
match is assumed to be a concave function of the agents’ investments. These assumptions
seem important in particular for the efficiency properties of the market outcome with
negligible search frictions. Our analysis indicates that with increasing returns one cannot
rule out coordination failures in markets with two–sided investments.
9See e.g. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1984) and Gale (1987). More recent contributions include De
Fraja and Sakovics (2001), Moreno and Wooders (2001) and Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007).
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: By Assumption 2 (i), S(0, 0) > 2 f. In what follows, we assume
that δ is large enough so that
δ(α+ β)S(0, 0)
2(1− δ) + δ(α+ β)
> 2 f. (24)
It is easy to see that then for all (I∗A, I
∗
B) satisfying (17)
δ(V ∗A + V
∗
B) =
δ(α+ β)S(I∗A, I
∗
B)
2(1− δ) + δ(α+ β)
> I∗A + I
∗
B + 2 f. (25)
Define
H ≡ {IA, IB|S(IA, IB)− IA − IB ≥ S(0, 0)} . (26)
By Assumption 2 (ii), H is a compact and convex set.
We first consider the case M¯A ≥ M¯B. Let
h∗A = M¯B/M¯A, h
∗
B = 1. (27)
Note that this implies h∗AM¯A = h
∗
BM¯B. Therefore, condition (13) is consistent with As-
sumption 1 (ii).
Let M ≡ {m = (mA,mB) ∈ IR
2
+ |mA + mB = 1} and define the correspondence
F :H →M by
F (IA, IB) ≡
{
m ∈M |
δα(mA)S(IA, IB)
2(1− δ) + δ[α(mA) + β(mB)]
= IA + f
}
. (28)
It is easily verified that Assumption 1 (i) and continuity of S(·) ensure that F (·) is a
non–empty, convex-valued and uhc correspondence. Next, define the correspondences
GA(mA, IB) ≡ argmax
IA
δα(mA)S(IA, IB)
2(1− δ) + δα(mA)
− IA, (29)
GB(mB, IA) ≡ argmax
IB
δβ(mB)S(IA, IB)
2(1− δ) + δβ(mB)
− IB.
Let G ≡ GA×GB. By Assumption 2 (ii) and continuity of α(·) and β(·), G:H ×M → H
is a non–empty, convex-valued and uhc correspondence.
By the properties of F and G, Kakutani’s fixed point theorem ensures that the corre-
spondence F ×G:H ×M → H ×M has a fixed point (m∗A,m
∗
B, I
∗
A, I
∗
B). Given (m
∗
A,m
∗
B)
and (h∗A, h
∗
B) in (27), we obtain from equilibrium condition (13)
M∗A = h
∗
AM¯A/α (m
∗
A) , M
∗
B = h
∗
BM¯B/β (m
∗
B) . (30)
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Also, given α = α(m∗A), β = β(m
∗
B) and (I
∗
A, I
∗
B), equilibrium condition (10) determines
(V ∗A , V
∗
B).
To prove existence of an equilibrium, it thus remains to show that equilibrium con-
ditions (11), (12) and (17) are satisfied. Since m∗ ∈ F (I∗A, I
∗
B), (10) and (28) im-
ply that δV ∗A = I
∗
A + f. By (29), therefore δV
∗
B ≥ I
∗
B + f . This proves that (11)
holds. As δV ∗A = I
∗
A + f and h
∗
B = 1, also (12) is satisfied. Finally, (17) holds be-
cause (I∗A, I
∗
B) ∈ G(m
∗, I∗A, I
∗
B). This completes the proof of existence of E
∗ for the case
M¯A ≥ M¯B. An analogous argument applies to the case M¯B ≥ M¯A.
To show that I∗A + I
∗
B > 0, suppose to the contrary that I
∗
A = I
∗
B = 0. Then by
(15)–(17) the following first–order conditions must hold:
δα
2(1− δ) + δα
∂S(0, 0)
∂IA
≤ 1,
δβ
2(1− δ) + δβ
∂S(0, 0)
∂IB
≤ 1. (31)
But for δ sufficiently close to unity this yields a contradiction to Assumption 2 (iii).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose that M¯i > M¯j and h
∗
i ≥ h
∗
j . Then h
∗
i M¯i > h
∗
jM¯j. This
yields a contradiction because h∗i M¯i = h
∗
jM¯j in any equilibrium by (1) and (13). This
proves that h∗i < h
∗
j ≤ 1. By (12) this implies δV
∗
i = I
∗
i + f . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: If (19) holds, then it follows from the proof of Proposition 7
below that, for δ sufficiently large, the equilibrium investments satisfy
S(I∗A, I
∗
B) > 2 I
∗
i + 2 f. (32)
Let, for example, M¯A > M¯B. Suppose to the contrary that M
∗
A ≤ M
∗
B. Then (1) implies
that α ≥ β. Therefore, by (10) and (32)
lim
δ→1
δV ∗A ≥
S(I∗A, I
∗
B)
2
> I∗A + f. (33)
For δ sufficiently large this yields a contradiction to Proposition 2. Thus,M∗A > M
∗
B. This
implies α < β by (1). Therefore, by (10), V ∗A < V
∗
B. If the inequality in (19) is reversed,
an analogous argument shows that M¯A > M¯B implies M
∗
A < M
∗
B and V
∗
A > V
∗
B for δ
sufficiently large. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Let M∗A > M
∗
B. Suppose that I
∗
A > 0. Then (15)–(17) imply
δα
2(1− δ) + δα
∂S(I∗A, I
∗
B)
∂IA
= 1,
δβ
2(1− δ) + δβ
∂S(I∗A, I
∗
B)
∂IB
≤ 1. (34)
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Since the investments are perfect substitutes, ∂S(I∗A, I
∗
B)/∂IA = ∂S(I
∗
A, I
∗
B)/∂IB. There-
fore (34) implies that α ≥ β. But by (1) this implies thatM∗A ≤M
∗
B, a contradiction. This
proves that M∗A > M
∗
B implies I
∗
A = 0. An analogous argument for the case M
∗
B > M
∗
A
completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: By (15)–(17), the equilibrium investments (I∗A, I
∗
B) satisfy
∂S(I∗A, I
∗
B)
∂IA
≤
2(1− δ) + δα
δα
,
∂S(I∗A, I
∗
B)
∂IB
≤
2(1− δ) + δβ
δβ
, (35)
with the equality holding if I∗i > 0.
We first show that I∗A 6= I
∗
B whenever I
∗
A + I
∗
B > 0 and M
∗
i 6= M
∗
j . Suppose the
contrary, i.e. I∗A = I
∗
B > 0. Then the equalities have to hold in (35). Further, by (1),
M∗i 6= M
∗
j implies α 6= β. Therefore (35) yields ∂S(I
∗
A, I
∗
B)/∂IA 6= ∂S(I
∗
A, I
∗
B)/∂IB. But
this yields a contradiction because I ≡ I∗A = I
∗
B implies
∂S(I∗A, I
∗
B)
∂IA
= lim
∆→0
S(I +∆, I)− S(I, I)
∆
(36)
= lim
∆→0
S(I, I +∆)− S(I, I)
∆
=
∂S(I∗A, I
∗
B)
∂IB
,
where the second equality holds by symmetry of (IA, IB). This proves that that I
∗
A 6= I
∗
B
whenever I∗A + I
∗
B > 0 and M
∗
i 6=M
∗
j .
In what follows, let M∗i 6=M
∗
j . It is easily verified that by (35)
(I∗A, I
∗
B) = argmax
(IA,IB)
S(IA, IB)−
2(1− δ) + δα
δα
IA −
2(1− δ) + δβ
δβ
IB. (37)
By Assumption 2 (ii), (I∗A, I
∗
B) is unique. Because I
∗
A 6= I
∗
B, (37) therefore implies
S(I∗A, I
∗
B)−
2(1− δ) + δα
δα
I∗A −
2(1− δ) + δβ
δβ
I∗B > (38)
S(I∗B, I
∗
A)−
2(1− δ) + δα
δα
I∗B −
2(1− δ) + δβ
δβ
I∗A
whenever I∗A + I
∗
B > 0. By symmetry of the investments, S(I
∗
A, I
∗
B) = S(I
∗
B, I
∗
A) so that
(38) simplifies to
[
2(1− δ) + δα
δα
−
2(1− δ) + δβ
δβ
]
[I∗B − I
∗
A] > 0 (39)
whenever I∗A + I
∗
B > 0.
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Suppose thatM∗A > M
∗
B. Then (1) implies that α < β. Therefore I
∗
A < I
∗
B by (39). An
analogous argument shows that M∗B > M
∗
A implies that I
∗
B < I
∗
A whenever I
∗
A + I
∗
B > 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: Let, for example, I∗A > 0. Then by (17), the following first–
order condition must hold
δα
2(1− δ) + δα
∂S(I∗A, I
∗
B)
∂IA
= 1. (40)
By (20) one has
∂W (I∗A, I
∗
B)
∂IA
=
δ(α+ β)
2(1− δ) + δ(α+ β)
∂S(I∗A, I
∗
B)
∂IA
− 1. (41)
Thus, by (40),
∂W (I∗A, I
∗
B)
∂IA
=
δ(α+ β)
2(1− δ) + δ(α+ β)
2(1− δ) + δα
δα
− 1 > 0. (42)
This proves that W (I∗A + ǫA, I
∗
B) > W (I
∗
A, I
∗
B) for some ǫA > 0. If (I
∗
A + I
∗
B) ∈ IR
2
++, then
the above argument implies that ∂W (I∗A + ǫ, I
∗
B + ǫ)/∂ǫ > 0 for ǫ sufficiently small. This
proves the second statement of the Proposition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: By (7), the efficient investments (IˆA, IˆB) are given by the
necessary and sufficient first–order conditions
∂S(IˆA, IˆB)
∂IA
≤ 1,
∂S(IˆA, IˆB)
∂IB
≤ 1, (43)
with the equality holding if Iˆi > 0. By (15)–(17), the equilibrium investments (I
∗
A, I
∗
B)
satisfy
δα
2(1− δ) + δα
∂S(I∗A, I
∗
B)
∂IA
≤ 1,
δβ
2(1− δ) + δβ
∂S(I∗A, I
∗
B)
∂IB
≤ 1, (44)
with the equality holding if I∗i > 0. As (44) becomes identical to (43) when δ → 1, this
proves the proposition. Q.E.D.
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